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Economic and Marketing Efficiency Among Corn Ethanol Plants 
 
Abstract 
We extend data envelopment analysis (DEA) to decompose the economic efficiency of a 
sample of ethanol plants into internal (technical and allocative) and boundary (marketing) 
sources. This decomposition allows us to evaluate the channels through which different plant 
characteristics affect plant performance. Results show that plants are very efficient from a 
technical point of view. Plants with higher production volumes seem to perform better not 
because of economies of scale but because they can secure more favorable prices (higher 
marketing efficiency) and execute production plans accordingly (higher allocative efficiency). 
This may rationalize the increase in the size of the average plant observed in the industry in 
recent years despite evidence of close to constant returns to scale. This suggests that plants may 
have incentives to horizontally integrate. Our results do not seem to point towards the existence 
of strong incentives to vertically integrate. Plants seem to have achieved significant 
improvements in performance through experience and learning-by-doing. Plants that are 
privately owned do not seem to perform better that those owned by farmers’ cooperatives.   
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Introduction  
Based on current scientific knowledge ethanol seems to be a viable “clean” substitute of 
fossil liquid fuels (although it can only substitute for fossil fuels at a relatively small scale) even 
considering indirect land use changes associated with increased production (see re-calculations 
by the California Air Resources Board). It may also favor corn (McNew) and livestock producers 
(Van Wart and Perrin). However, in the last few years (especially since 2007) increases in corn 
prices and reductions in oil prices (and hence in ethanol prices) have hit the industry. In addition, 
a considerable amount of volatility in commodity markets has increased uncertainty and shorten 
plants’ planning horizon (Tyner, 2009). As a result the ability of plants to make production and 
marketing  decisions  that  maximize  their  operating  margins  becomes  critical.  Identifying  and 
quantifying  potential  drivers  of  plants  economic  performance  may  be  of  interest  to  plant 
managers,  government  officials,  famers,  and  other  stakeholders  (e.g.  banks,  investors, 
environmental agencies). We draw from the theory of the firm (Gibbons, 2005) and the theory of 
the  industry’s  life  cycle  (Williamson,  1975  and  Stigler,  1951)  to  shed  some  light  on  these 
potential drivers.
1 In particular we integrate  economic  efficiency measures and firm/industry 
theories by defining and calculating a new source of economic efficiency (marketing efficiency) 
and linking it to characteristics of the plants hypothesized as drivers of performance by the 
aforementioned theories. 
 
DEA Analysis: Intensive and Extensive Margins 
Performance, as discussed by the theory of the firm (Gibbons), is determined by the 
choice of boundaries (which activities are conducted internally and which are outsourced) and by 
                                                 
1 Given available data we can only identify and quantify correlates of economic performance rather than actual 
drivers. However the aforementioned theories propose certain causalities that will guide the correlation analysis in 
this study. We can then discuss the consistency of correlations with causalities proposed by the theories.    4 
choices internal to the organization once the boundaries have been set. We call the former, 
efficiency at the extensive margin, and the latter efficiency at the intensive margin. Conventional 
methods of measurement of economic efficiency allow quantification of internal efficiency. We 
propose to extend these methods in a way that permits quantification of efficiency at the 
extensive margin and its role on the overall economic performance of the firm. Once we have 
calculated overall performance and decomposed it into its internal (technical and allocative) and 
boundary (marketing/procurement) sources, we find the statistical link between these sources and 
drivers proposed by the theories of the firm and industry’s life cycle. 
Empirical assessments of the theory of the firm usually link potential drivers to actual 
measures of performance. The most commonly used measures of performance are returns over 
assets (ROA), returns on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q (Dybvig et al.) Differential performance 
may be explained by managerial ability but also by constraints faced by plants in the market. 
Studies using ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q do not model constraints but rather assume all plants 
face the same constraints which can be distortive if constraints vary across plants.   
Evaluating plants’ performance subject to constraints requires modeling and 
quantification of those constraints. Frontier methods developed in production economics (Coelli 
et al.) provide the tools to quantify technological constraints. Technological frontiers may be 
calculated parametrically or non-parametrically. The latter is especially suitable for small 
samples. Since we have 33 observations in our sample we will pursue a non-parametric 
calculation of the technological frontier. Based on this frontier conventional measures of 
economic efficiency decompose overall efficiency into technical and allocative sources.
2 
Technical efficiency represents the ability of managers to achieve an engineering optimum. 
                                                 
2 A third component sometimes included is a measure of input congestion. This component measures the extent to 
which too much of one input (given quantity of other inputs) reduces the productivity of the plant.   5 
Allocative efficiency assumes prices are exogenous (an exception is Cherchye et al. which 
considers non-competitive settings) and measures performance based on the alignment of the 
chosen input-output combination to exogenous prices. Therefore conventional non-parametric 
measurement of performance assumes all sources of inefficiency are internal to the plant. For 
this reason, it can not evaluate performance at the extensive margin; i.e. the ability of the plant to 
increase operating margins by partially controlling prices through the integration/outsourcing 
decision. In the context of the ethanol industry this could be a serious drawback. Decisions by 
plants on whether to conduct marketing and procurement activities internally (vertical 
integration) or externally through contracts and spot markets may partially affect prices that they 
pay and receive. We propose to extend conventional DEA methods to account for increases in 
operating margins (measured by net operating revenues or NOR) due to favorable pricing 
attained through vertical integration, management of contracts and spots, and/or hedging. 
Naturally we call this new measure, marketing efficiency. Obtaining measures of efficiency at 
both the intensive and extensive margins will allow us to identify the channels through which 
drivers of performance proposed by the theory of the firm affect plant success in the corn ethanol 
industry.  
 
Characterization of Technology from Individual Plant Data 
Our data consist of 33 quarterly reports of input and output quantities and prices from a 
sample of seven ethanol plants in the Midwest. We refer to each quarterly observation as a 
decision making unit (DMU.) DMUs are assumed to share a technology that transforms a vector 
of 7 inputs (corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and “other processing 
costs”) into 3 outputs (ethanol, dried distiller’s grains with  10% moisture content (DDGS), and   6 
modified wet distiller’s grains with 55% moisture content (MWDGS).) Observed combinations 
of inputs used and outputs produced are taken to be representative points from the feasible 
ethanol technology.  In this study we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to infer the 
boundaries of the feasible technology set from the observed points, following the notation in 
Färe, et al. The production technology can be represented by a graph denoting the collection of 
all feasible input and output vectors: 
73 ,: GR x u x L u  
Where  u L , is the input correspondence which is defined as the collection of all input vectors 
N x  that yield at least output vector 
M u . 
 
Conventional Decomposition of Economic Efficiency 
A given DMU is deemed economically efficient whenever it chooses a feasible (subject 
to the graph) input-output combination that maximizes NOR given prices.  In this section we 
proceed to calculate and decompose economic efficiency assuming that prices are exogenous and 
hence there is no marketing strategy that can affect prices at which ethanol is sold and corn 
procured. 
Assuming variable returns to scale
3 and strong disposability of inputs and outputs the 
graph can be denoted by: 
33
1
, , : , , 1,  1,...,33
j j j j
j
GR V S x u u zM x zN z j              (1) 
Where  z  depicts a row vector of 33 intensity variables, M  is the 33x3 matrix of observed 
outputs, 
j u  is the 1x3 vector of observed outputs corresponding to the jth DMU,  N  is the 33x7   7 
matrix of observed inputs, and 
j x  is the 1x7 vector of observed inputs corresponding to the jth 
DMU. 
We define the set of all combinations of inputs and outputs resulting in higher NOR than 
that actually achieved by the  th j  DMU as: 
, , :
j j j j j j j j j j j j j
g x u x u p x r u p x r u           (2)   
Where 
j p  is the vector of input prices paid and 
j r  the vector of output prices received by the jth 
DMU and the subscript g denotes greater than observed NOR. 
We define an iso-NOR line in ethanol and corn space corresponding to the jth DMU as 
those combinations of ethanol and corn that result in the same level of NOR given 
j p  and 
j r . 
Fig. 1 depicts this set graphically in the corn and ethanol space (i.e. keeping all other inputs and 
outputs fixed.) The set 
j
g  consists of all those points above the iso-NOR line as indicated by the 
arrows with direction northwest. 
In Fig. 1 the feasible technology set is represented by a graph displaying variable returns 
to scale and strong disposability of inputs and outputs as indicated by the arrows moving from 
the frontier ( Eth c u f x ) with direction southeast. As clearly seen in Fig. 1, the set 
j
g  includes 
combinations outside the graph and hence not attainable by DMUs in the sample. The subset of 
observations in 
j
g  that belong to the graph and are hence attainable by DMUs is depicted by the 
intersection of both sets delimited by the bold lines in Fig. 1: 
,,
j j j
g c Eth x u GR V S                 (3) 
The th j  DMU could choose any alternative production plan within the area denoted by 
the bold lines achieving a feasible increase in NOR.   8 
We apply in this study a hyperbolic graph efficiency measure which means that the 
technically efficient projection of a given observation to the boundary of the technology set 
follows a hyperbolic path defined by equi-proportional reductions in inputs and increases in 
outputs. The value of the proportionate change necessary to reach the boundary, 
j TE , is defined 
as the technical efficiency of plant j: 
1 , / , min : , ,
j j j j j j
v g c Eth TE x u V S x u GR V S       (4) 
Where   is a scalar defining the proportionate changes and the rest is as before.  
Technical efficiency defined in Eq. (4) is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the distance from 
,
jj
c Eth xu  to point A which corresponds to the technically efficient allocation in corn and ethanol 
space. Note however that point A does not correspond to the maximum feasible NOR level since 
it does not coincide with the point of tangency between the iso-NOR and the graph (point B.) 
The allocation that achieves the maximum level of NOR subject to the graph is called the overall 
economic efficient allocation. 
Technically, we define this maximum feasible level of NOR as: 
, max        . .  ( , ) ,  
j j j j
xu p x r u st x u GR V S         (5) 
Where 
j denotes maximum NOR attainable by j subject to the graph and observed prices,  x  is 
the vector of inputs, and u  is the vector of outputs and the rest is as defined before. 
Overall economic efficiency under variable returns to scale, 
j
v E  , is measured by the 
hyperbolic distance between a given observation j and the iso-NOR line corresponding to 
j . 
The hyperbolic distance is computed through calculation of the reduction of observed inputs and 
equiproportional expansion of observed byproducts such that the iso-NOR corresponding to 
j    9 
is reached. This is illustrated by Fig. 3 where overall environmental efficiency is the distance 
between  ,
jj
c Eth xu  and point C. 
Since the movement from  ,
jj
c Eth xu  to C is a hyperbolic one, the measure of overall 
economic efficiency, 
j
v E ,  is related to maximum NOR in the following manner: 
1
          1,2,...,
j j j j j j j
vv E p x E r u j J           (6) 
We can decompose 
j
v E  into purely technical efficiency 
j
v TE   (represented graphically by 
the distance between  ,
jj
c DDGS xu  and A) and allocative inefficiency 
j
v AE  (represented 
graphically by the distance between A and C.) Overall efficiency can be expressed as: 
j j j
v v v E AE TE                    (7) 









                    (8) 
Based on the solution to the problem described in Eq. (5) we calculate overall economic 
efficiency by solving the implicit Eq. (6) for each observation.  
 
 Limitations of Conventional Decomposition and Marketing Efficiency 
Plants’ bargaining or marketing strategies may affect, at least to some extent, the prices 
obtained for ethanol and paid for corn. This fact is ignored by the conventional decomposition of 
efficiency. In order to capture the effect of plants’ pricing strategies (integration, contracts, and 
spots) on performance we introduce the concept of marketing efficiency. Provided we have price 
                                                 
3 In this way we minimize stronger assumptions about convexity that may result in artificially low efficiency 
indexes.   10 
observations for different plants located in different states and across time, differences among 
prices paid and received by DMUs can be due to spatial patterns, managerial efficiency and 
inflation. The part due to inflation is controlled for by adjusting all prices to a base quarter (3
rd 
quarter of 2006) using the Producer Price Index (PPI) as calculated by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The managerial and spatial parts however, are more difficult to deal with. 
Managerial differences are due to the fact that plants use different marketing 
arrangements (including spot markets, contracts, and marketers as described in Table 1) to 
procure their inputs and sell their outputs. Since we have one plant per state we have a perfect 
correlation between space and manager and hence distinguishing between managerial and spatial 
sources of price differentials requires quarterly data on prices at the State level. Using these data 
as a basis we introduce in this section a new concept capturing the ability of plant managers to 
obtain prices as favorable as possible in their State.  
We denote market prices (as opposed to prices reported by plants) faced by the jth DMU 
as  ,
jj
MM rx. Output market prices faced by the jth DMU, 
j
M r , consist of ethanol market price 
j
eth r  
and prices directly reported by plants in all other revenue categories (byproducts). Input market 
prices 
j
M x  consist of corn market prices and prices directly reported by plants in all other cost 
categories. State level data on corn prices is publicly available from USDA NASS Agricultural 
Prices. Ethanol prices, on the other hand, were obtained from 2006 and 2007 publications of 
Ethanol and Biodiesel News magazine (now Ethanol and Biofuels News).  
Using these prices we are now ready to define our novel concept of marketing efficiency. 
Technical and allocative efficiency do not change. We introduce, however, marketing efficiency 
as an additional component of overall economic efficiency. Marketing efficiency denotes the 
increase (reduction) in revenue and equi-proportional reduction (increase) in operating cost   11 
resulting from the ability of the managers to secure prices more (less) favorable than spot market 
prices. Therefore we are, in fact, comparing two levels of NOR under the same input-output 
allocation but different sets of prices (spot market prices and prices actually obtained).  
Graphically this amounts to measuring the distance between two iso-NOR lines. However since 
the two iso-NOR lines are calculated based on different prices they display different slopes 
rendering them not comparable. To make the comparison possible we measure the distance 
between iso-NOR under observed prices and a parallel version of the iso-NOR with market 
prices.  This is illustrated by the distance between D and C in figure 4.
4 
We measure the distance between both iso-NOR lines by implementing the following 
procedure. The marketing efficiency of the 
th j  DMU is defined as the hyperbolic distance 
between maximum NOR with observed prices and NOR obtained under NOR maximizing 
combination and spot market prices: 
1 ** j j j j j j j
M r u ME p x ME     1,2,..., jJ        (9) 
Where 
j
M  is the NOR DMU j would have obtained had it faced market prices and used 
NOR maximizing combination (i.e. 
** j j j j j
M M M r u p x ), 
j ME  is marketing efficiency of the jth 
DMU, 
* jj ru   are  revenues  obtained  by  the  jth  DMU  at  the  NOR  maximizing  point,  and 
* jj px  are costs incurred by the jth DMU at the NOR maximizing point. 
Since NOR with market prices can be lower or higher than NOR with observed prices, 
j ME  will not be bounded between zero and one. In fact if observed NOR 
j  are higher (lower) 
than 
j
M  then 
j ME >(<)  1. Purely  technical  efficiency 
j
v TE   (represented graphically  by the 
                                                 
4 We have illustrated a situation in which actual prices are more favorable than spot market prices and hence Iso-
NOR
B is positioned above and to the left of Iso-NOR
M. If actual prices were less favorable than market prices then 
Iso-NOR
M would be located above and to the left of Iso-NOR
B and the marketing efficiency score would be lower 
than one.    12 
distance between  ,
jj
c DDGS xu  and A), and allocative efficiency 
j
v AE  (represented graphically by 
the distance between A and C) stay the same. Marketing efficiency is calculated as explained in 
(9) and the new overall efficiency is “adjusted” by factoring in marketing efficiency. Overall 
efficiency with market efficiency, 
jME
v E , can be expressed as: 
jME j j j j j
v v v v E E ME AE TE ME               (10) 
Based on values of 
j
M  we calculate marketing efficiency by solving the implicit Eq. (9) 
for each observation.  
Conventional and expanded measures of economic efficiency and their decomposition are 
calculated for a sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol plants. We first characterize the data 
collected and the plants surveyed, and then calculate their economic efficiency. 
 
Data 
Until recently, no publicly‐available data on the economic and technical performance of the 
current generation of plants was available. Previous studies have calculated input requirements 
and byproducts’ yield per gallon of ethanol produced by plants. Using engineering data McAloon 
et al. (2000) and Kwiatkowski et al. (2006) measured considerable improvement in plant 
technical efficiency between 2000 and 2006. Shapouri, et al. (2005) reported input requirements 
and cost data based on a USDA sponsored survey of plants for the year 2002. Wang et al. (2007) 
and Plevin et al. (2008), reported results based on spreadsheet models of the industry (GREET 
and BEACCON, respectively.) Pimentel et al. (2005) and Eidman (2007) reported average 
performances of plants although they do not clearly indicate the sources of their estimates. 
Finally Perrin et al. (2009) reported results on input requirements, operating costs, and operating 
revenues based on a survey of seven dry grind plants in the Midwest during 2006 and 2007.   13 
With the exception of Shapouri et al. and Perrin et al. all of these studies reported values 
corresponding to the average plant (not individual plants) which prevents comparison of relative 
performances. In addition, it is generally believed that the industry has become more efficient 
and technologically homogeneous since 2005. Since the data used in Shapouri et al. was 
collected in 2002 it may not be representative of current technologies in the industry. In contrast 
to Shapouri et al., Perrin et al. surveyed plants in operation during 2006 and 2007 and employed 
a much more restrictive sampling criteria (discussed below) which yielded a modern and 
technologically homogenous sample of plants. This sample is believed to be more representative 
of current technologies and is, hence, our data of choice to assess the economic performance of 
plants and their drivers. 
Data by Perrin et al. consists of 33 quarterly reports of input and output quantities and 
prices from a sample of seven ethanol plants in the Midwest. Results of our survey contained 
total expenditures in labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs and, as a result, we 
calculated implicit quantities of these inputs dividing total expenditures by their corresponding 
price indexes. Observed combinations of inputs and outputs are taken to be representative points 
from the feasible ethanol technology.  In this study we use non parametric programming methods 
(Färe, et al) to infer the boundaries of the feasible technology set. We model the technology as a 
multiple input-output graph and all efficiency measures are defined in reference to that graph. 
 
Ethanol Plants: Characteristics 
Table 1 presents some characteristics of the seven dry grind ethanol plants surveyed. 
According to Table 1 the plants produced an average rate equivalent to 53.1 million gallons of 
ethanol per year, with a range from 42.5 million gallons per year to 88.1 million gallons per year.    14 
The period surveyed included the third quarter of 2006 until the fourth quarter of 2007 (six 
consecutive quarters).  In addition plants could be differentiated by how much byproduct they 
sold as DDGS (10% moisture) compared to MWDGS (55% moisture.) Variation on this variable 
was significant, averaging 54% of byproduct sold as DDGS, but ranging from one plant that sold 
absolutely no byproduct as DDGS to another plant that sold nearly all byproduct (97%) as 
DDGS. 
Finally, plant marketing strategies are also characterized in Table 1.  In purchasing input 
feedstock, five of the six plants purchased corn via customer contracts.  Similarly, in selling 
ethanol, five of the six plants used third parties or agents.  Byproduct marketing across plants 
displayed a higher degree of variance.  Marketing of DDGS was split fairly evenly between spot 
markets and third parties/agents.  An even higher variability was observed for MWDGS, where 
no one marketing strategy (spot market, customer contract, or third party/agent) was significantly 
more prevalent across plants than others. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of inputs used and outputs produced by the 33 DMUs 
in our sample. As mentioned before the basic observations in this study corresponds to a plant in 
a given quarter; so two quarters of the same plant are considered as two different observations as 
are two plants in the same quarter.  
 
Calculation and Decomposition of Efficiency 
Conventional measures of economic efficiency and their decomposition, Eq. (7)-(8), are 
calculated for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol plants and reported in Table 3.
5 Table 3 
shows that the economic efficiency of the average DMU is 0.89 which suggests that there may 
                                                 
5 We calculated the value of 
j
v TE  using MATLAB as indicated in the Appendix A. Maximum NOR have also been 
calculated using programming routines in MATLAB.   15 
have been some room for improvement in profitability. Almost all the observed inefficiency 
comes from allocative sources as indicated by the average value but also by the dispersion 
observed in this source across DMUs. This in turn means that although most DMUs are 
operating in the technological frontier they are doing so in points that do not coincide with the 
NOR-maximizing point (such as point B in Fig. 3). 
Based on computed values of 
j
M  (see description of Eq. 9) we calculate marketing 
efficiency by solving the implicit Eq. (9) for each observation. The FZERO procedure in 
MATLAB was used in calculations. Technical and allocative efficiency are the same as before. 
Measures of marketing efficiency and adjusted overall economic efficiency are also displayed in 
Table 3. The average of marketing efficiency indexes is 0.97. This reveals that, in average, plants 
obtained less favorable relative prices than those observed in spot markets by integrating or 
managing contracts to sell ethanol and buy corn. We should not, however, jump to the 
conclusion that plants were inefficient in marketing and procurement activities. First integrating 
or contracting provide certainty to plants which is valuable to managers either because they are 
risk averse and/or because “price lock-ins” guarantee a given profitability which is commonly 
used as collateral to raise more capital from investors or banks. These benefits of contracting are 
not factored in here. In addition significant dispersion is observed across DMUs as denoted by a 
standard deviation of 0.09 and a big difference between minimum (0.79) and maximum (1.27) 
values. In fact the two main sources of dispersion in plant performance are the allocative and 
marketing components. 
Overall economic efficiency changes when marketing efficiency is included in the 
analysis. The average overall economic efficiency is reduced from 0.89 to about 0.87. This 
reduction reflects the fact that contracted prices were less favorable than spot market prices faced   16 
by DMUs in their States. Furthermore standard deviation increases from 0.07 to 0.1. In light of 
these results marketing efficiency seems to be an important component in overall economic 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency continues to be an important component while technical 
efficiency does not seem to be an important source of overall economic inefficiency. 
These results illustrate the importance of accounting for price bargaining in the 
measurement of efficiency. In this particular case most plants are penalized for operating with 
prices less favorable than spot prices. In fact only one DMU is rewarded for contracting prices 
more favorable than spots. These results suggest that DMUs could have obtained higher NORs 
by waiting and using spot markets to procure corn and sell ethanol. The analysis does not, 
however, incorporate risk aversion, production planning, capital management, and stochastic 
components that may well rationalize contracting at prices below spot. 
We will proceed now to link these measures of performance at the intensive and 
extensive margin to potential drivers proposed by the theory of the firm and the theory of 
industry’s life cycle.  
 
Identifying Drivers of Performance 
The theory of the firm (TF), as unified by Gibbons (2005), and the theory of the 
industry’s life-cycle (ILC) originated by Williamson (1975) and Stigler (1951), combine insights 
from the transaction costs, property rights, rent-seeking, and incentive-based approaches to 
identify drivers of boundary choices by a firm and the impact of those choices on performance 
both at the intensive and extensive margin.  
According to Stigler’s theory of the industry’s life-cycle, plants built at non-initial stages 
of the industry are more likely to maximize economic performance by increasing size and   17 
exploiting economies of scale (i.e. they should be operating at ranges of technology displaying 
non-increasing returns to scale). We posit that the ethanol industry is not in its initial stages. It is 
an industry with a high frequency and scale of transactions, with well established upstream-
downstream channels and with a homogeneous and well known technology. Therefore we 
condense Stigler’s argument in the following hypothesis.  
H1 (returns to scale): DMUs in our sample display non-increasing returns to scale (exploit 
economies of scale).  
Returns to scale may be calculated by combining technical efficiency under variable, 
non-increasing and constant returns to scale. Calculation of technical efficiency can be done on 
the basis of a technology displaying constant returns to scale (CRS), decreasing returns to scale 
(DRS), increasing returns to scale (IRS), or variable returns to scale (VRS).  Technical efficiency 
with variable returns to scale has already been defined and measured. Technical efficiency with 
constant returns to scale technology is: 
1 , / , min : , / , , 1, 2,...,
j j j j j
c TE x u C S x u GR C S j J    (11) 
We calculated the value of  , / ,
j j j
c TE x u C S  using MATLAB as indicated in Appendix 
B. 
Technical efficiency with non-increasing returns to scale technology is: 
1 , / , min : , / , , 1, 2,...,
j j j j j
n TE x u N S x u GR N S j J    (12) 
We calculated the value of  , / ,
j j j
n TE x u N S  using MATLAB as indicated in Appendix 
C.   18 
Scale inefficiency can be defined in terms of two ratios. The ratio between technical 
efficiency with constant returns to scale as defined in (11) to technical efficiency with variable 
returns to scale as defined in (4): 
1 , , / , / , / ,
j j j j j j j j j
cv S x u TE x u C S TE x u V S         (13) 
The second ratio is that between technical efficiency with constant returns (11) and 
technical efficiency with non-increasing returns to scale (12): 
2 , , / , / , / ,
j j j j j j j j j
cn S x u TE x u C S TE x u N S         (14) 
As developed by Färe et al. if ratio (13) is lower than one and if, in addition, ratio (14) is 
lower than (equal to) one, the observation shows decreasing (increasing) returns to scale. The 
measures defined in (11) and (12) are calculated with the FMINCON routine in MATLAB. The 
results for all 33 observations are reported in Table 4. This table shows that the majority of 
DMUs (and hence the average DMU) are operating in portions of the technology which are very 
close to displaying CRS; i.e. the average scale efficiency is very close to 1. A total of 19 DMUs 
display CRS, 12 exhibit IRS, and 2 display DRS. Results in Table 4 are consistent with H1. 
Plants operating in the corn-ethanol industry do not seem to display strong increasing returns to 
scale. In fact, most plants seem to be operating at close to constant returns to scale. This is 
consistent with predictions from the Stigler’s theory of the industry’s life cycle for industries at 
non-initial stages of evolution. 
According to the theory of the firm, integration, by avoiding double marginalization
6, 
may reduce the price at which corn is procured and increase the price obtained for ethanol. 
Conventional DEA would not capture this potential gain. Any change in price would be deemed 
exogenous and not the result of a careful boundary choice by the plant. In the extension 
                                                 
6 Integration between an ethanol plant and an elevator reduces procurement costs for the ethanol plant since the 
elevator’s mark-up is not included in the final price of the corn.    19 
developed here, however, the effect of integration on prices is captured by our measure of 
marketing efficiency. Through enhanced marketing efficiency, integration may increase overall 
economic efficiency.  
In addition integration may also increase allocative efficiency if it is associated with a 
reduction in input and output price volatility which, in turn, allows managers to plan production 
ahead. In the ethanol industry downstream integration is more likely to reduce price uncertainty. 
Some plants market their own ethanol while others rely on marketers. A common feature of 
different arrangements in the industry between ethanol plants and marketers is that the ethanol 
producer determines its own output level, and then the marketer has to sell the entire production.
7 
Under integration (the plant sells ethanol directly to blenders or brokers) the producer may 
negotiate price and quantity simultaneously which may allow the production department and the 
marketing department to coordinate and choose the appropriate combination of inputs and 
outputs. To sum up integration may enhance both marketing and allocative efficiency. It may 
increase the former by avoiding double marginalization and the latter by reducing uncertainty. 
This conjecture inspires the following hypothesis.
8 
H2 (integration - performance): There is a positive correlation between the degree of vertical 
integration of a DMU and both marketing and allocative efficiency.  
The measure of integration is the average of upstream integration and downstream 
integration. The former is calculated as the percentage of total corn purchased directly to farmers 
rather than elevators. The latter is the percentage of ethanol sold directly to blenders and brokers 
instead of marketers. Our data shows that upstream integration is, on average, higher than 
downstream integration; i.e. 53% of corn is purchased directly from farmers while 29% of 
                                                 
7 Report on ethanol market concentration, Federal Trade Commission. 
8 Observation 32 was deemed an outlier and removed in testing hypotheses 2-7. The marketing efficiency of that 
observation was higher than the average by more than three times the standard deviation.    20 
ethanol is sold directly to blenders. Moreover plants in our sample have declared a mix of 
integration and outsourcing in the corn side (Harrigan 1984, labeled this organizational hybrid 
taper integration) and full or no integration on the ethanol side. 
As displayed in Table 5.a. only allocative efficiency seems to be statistically correlated 
with integration. Furthermore, as shown in Table 6, there is a positive (although rather low) 
correlation between integration and allocative efficiency. Therefore integration seems to improve 
economic efficiency by enhancing the ability of plants to align the input-output combination to 
prices. Integration, per se, does not seem to help plants achieve better relative prices through 
elimination of double marginalization; i.e. there is no statistically significant relationship 
between vertical integration and marketing efficiency. The latter result may be due to the fact 
that while trading through intermediaries (elevators and marketers) implies a surplus loss for 
ethanol plants (due to double marginalization), these intermediaries, by pooling volumes and 
exploiting their size, may be able to obtain better prices than those the individual plant would 
have obtained. If marketers transfer some of the additional surplus obtained from better pricing 
to ethanol plants then plants may see the loss from double marginalization outweighed by this 
transfer. 
Table 5.b. shows the strength of the statistical link between different factors and 
efficiency when different subsets of more than one factor (N-way ANOVA) are tested. This table 
shows that the link between integration and efficiency is not robust; i.e. integration seems to be 
statistically relevant in explaining efficiency in two subsets (Time-Integration, and Time-Size-
Integration) and statistically irrelevant in two other subsets (Integration, and Size-Integration).  
A second factor to be considered here is size. There is a rather large subset of the theory 
of the firm that concerns itself with the link between the size of a DMU and its economic   21 
performance. This literature discusses and tests the “Law of Proportionate Effect” (Gibrat’s 
Law). This law depicts that a firm’s growth rate and economic performance (usually measured 
by ROA, ROE or Tobin’s Q) is independent of its size; Gibrat (1931). On the other hand, 
Baumol (1959) hypothesized that performance increases with the size of the firm. There are 
several reasons why a bigger DMU may display a better economic performance than their 
smaller counterparts. Some of the most important reasons range from economies of scale, to 
superior transportation and storage capacity, to a better bargaining power in contracting and 
trading. Audretsch et al. (2002) provides a detailed survey of empirical work on the link between 
firm size and economic performance and highlights the following conclusion: “Both firm size 
and age are (positively) correlated with the survival and growth of entrants” (Geroski, 1995, p. 
434).  
The average capacity in the ethanol industry has steadily increased (Urbanchuk, 2008). 
The increase in average size coupled with the fact that plants in our sample do not seem to be 
obtaining increasing returns to scale (results and discussion of Hypothesis 1) suggests that there 
may be a benefit from increasing size beyond technological reasons. Attainment of more 
favorable prices due to a better bargaining position (as proposed by the literature following 
Baumol) would not be identified by the conventional DEA decomposition but it can be captured 
by the concept of marketing efficiency introduced here. In addition, enhanced storage and 
transportation capacity may translate into higher flexibility in production and increased 
allocative efficiency. Therefore we posit Baumol’s hypothesis of a positive link between size and 
economic performance and test it in the context of the ethanol industry based on our sample. 
H3 (size - performance): There is a positive correlation between, on one hand, size of a DMU 
and, on the other, its marketing and allocative efficiency.   22 
According to our results in Table 5.a. the size of a DMU seems to have a statistically 
significant relationship with its economic performance. Moreover, as indicated by positive 
correlation coefficients in Table 6, bigger DMUs attain better economic performance through 
both better price bargaining (marketing efficiency) and better planning of production given 
prices (allocative efficiency). Table 5.b. reveals the robustness of the link between size and 
efficiency. In fact size is statistically correlated with all types of efficiency in all subsets except 
the subset that includes all factors. The latter may be due to the small size of the sample (33) 
relative to the number of explanatory variables included (3).  
Failure to reject H3 denotes a statistical connection between the size of a DMU and its 
performance. On the other hand rejection of H2 seemed to suggest that the benefits obtained by 
DMUs from integration (avoiding double marginalization) where outweighed by better pricing 
achieved by marketers through pooling of volumes. If this were true, bigger DMUs may also be 
able to extract a higher surplus through integration (avoiding double marginalization) and yet, 
they may still be able to bargain favorable prices due to their size. This should make integration 
more effective in enhancing economic efficiency only for bigger plants. This can be tested by 
looking at the statistical relationship between efficiency, and the interaction between integration 
and size. 
H4 (integration*size - performance): There is a positive correlation between the interaction 
term (integration*size) and performance. 
  Given p-values displayed and Table 5.a. and correlation coefficients in Table 6 we fail to 
reject H4. Low p-values in Table 5.a. denote a statistically significant relationship between the 
interacting term integration*size and economic efficiency. Table 5.b. reveals that this link is 
robust across subsets. In addition the positive correlation coefficients between the interacting   23 
term and economic efficiency in Table 6, suggests that integration may be more effective in 
enhancing efficiency the bigger the DMU. Results are consistent with the fact that integration 
may allow DMUs to bargain favorable prices while, at the same time, avoiding double 
marginalization.  
Despite the individual and/or joint effect of integration and size on efficiency, there is a 
branch of the empirical literature on the theory of the firm that looks at the potential link between 
the size of a firm and its integration decision (Hortacsu et al.). If integration is in fact more 
effective in enhancing efficiency the bigger the DMU, we would expect that bigger DMUs 
would be more likely to integrate vertically than their smaller competitors. As a result of this 
conjecture we posit the following hypothesis. 
H5 (size - integration): There is a positive correlation between the size of a DMU and its degree 
of vertical integration.  
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) between size and integration reveals that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between these factors at a 1% significance level.
9 In addition 
the correlation coefficient between both variables is 0.31. Therefore we fail to reject H5. Results 
from testing H3-H5 seem to suggest that size operates on economic efficiency through at least 
two channels. First, it operates directly by enhancing the ability of plants to bargain better prices 
and by increasing allocative efficiency. Second, it seems to operate on efficiency by both 
increasing the likelihood of integration and the effectiveness of integration on enhancing 
efficiency.
10 Therefore there seems to be non-technological benefits from increasing size that 
                                                 
9 The ANOVA results in a p-value of 0.002. 
10 This effect is non-linear in the sense that integration may be modeled as a function of size and this function, 
interacted with size itself, affects efficiency.    24 
may rationalize the recent trend of increase in average plant size in the industry.
11 Finally, a word 
of caution is in place here. Results from testing of H3 and H4 suggested that integration may 
enhance efficiency when plants are big. But testing of H5 revealed a correlation between size and 
integration. As a result the correlation between the interaction term and efficiency may be 
confounding the effect of size with the effect of integration given size.
12  
According to the organizational approach to the theory of the firm, since different 
ownership structures imply different governance schemes, ownership may affect the internal 
efficiency and performance of plants. We have two types of ownership structures in our sample; 
cooperatives and privately owned firms.
13 Cooperatives are usually formed by farmers who, in 
turn, supply feedstock to the plant. Thus the objective function of the plant may incorporate the 
welfare of farmers which, in turn, may not be consistent with the plants’ NOR maximization. As 
a result we posit the following hypothesis. 
H6 (cooperative status - performance): There is a negative correlation between the cooperative 
status of a DMU and its economic performance. 
As indicated by Table 5.a. the cooperative status of a DMU does not seem to be 
statistically linked to its performance. Therefore we reject H6. This suggests that managers in 
cooperatively owned plants may not incorporate the welfare of their members (farmers) in their 
objective function. It is also possible that these plants incorporate members’ welfare but they 
                                                 
11 Another potential reason for changes in the integration decision is experience. According to the theory of the firm 
(Qian), plants tend to increase integration as they gain more experience. We can not test this based on our sample as 
plants have declared the same level of integration throughout the period under analysis. 
12 If efficiency does in fact depend on size (e.g. E(size)) and, in addition, integration depended on size (e.g. I(size)) 
modeling efficiency as a function of the interaction would result in E (size*I(size)). This may well be capturing the 
overall effect of size and not of integration through size. 
13 Some plants are owned by private firms which are, in turn, owned by public corporations. We do not distinguish 
here between plants owned (at least partially) by public corporations and those that are not. We treat all privately 
owned plants homogeneously in terms of ownership.   25 
may be increasing efficiency through another source that partially outweighs NOR losses. In fact 
DMUs corresponding to cooperatively owned plants in our sample tend to be of bigger size. 
Another source of efficiency improvement is learning-by-doing. Usually firms enhance 
efficiency as they learn more about their own technology and the functioning of the markets in 
which they operate. Since our sample includes observations from 7 plants during 6 quarters, 
learning-by-doing should be captured by increases in average efficiency across time. Therefore 
to find out whether learning seems to be improving efficiency among plants in our sample we 
posit and test and following hypothesis. 
H7 (time - performance): There is a positive correlation between time and economic 
performance. 
Based on results in Table 5.a. and 6 we fail to reject H7. In fact time and all types of 
efficiency (overall, allocative, and marketing) seem to be statistically significantly correlated at 
1% level of significance. Table 5.b. seems to confirm the robustness of this link; time is 
significantly correlated with all types of efficiency in all subsets. Moreover the correlation 
coefficients in Table 6 show that time (or learning) seems to enhance allocative efficiency more 
than marketing efficiency. This result may be explained by the fact that allocative efficiency is a 
source of internal efficiency in the plant. It represents the ability the marketing and the 
production departments to coordinate activities and align prices paid and received with a specific 
production plan. This internal source of performance should be expected to increase as plants 
gain more experience and shake out initial inefficiencies. On the other hand, marketing 
efficiency is a boundary source of performance. The ability of plants to obtain more favorable 
prices depends on their bargaining power which may not be significantly affected by experience 
but rather by other factors such as size as demonstrated above.   26 
 
Average Effect of Size, Time, and Integration  on Efficiency 
Results from the ANOVA are consistent with the hypotheses that time and size may 
increase overall economic efficiency through both the intensive (allocative) and extensive 
(marketing) margins. In order for us to have a better grasp of the quantitative effect these factors 
may have on efficiency we partition the sample into big and small DMUs, DMUs belonging to 
first and second half of the period under analysis, and DMUs with a degree of integration above 
the median (0.30) and below the median. We have calculated average efficiency for each 
subgroup and compare them. Results are presented in Table 8.  
Consistently with the positive correlation in Table 7, overall economic efficiency seems 
to have improved through time as indicated by row 13 of Table 8. This improvement is mostly 
explained by increases in both marketing and allocative sources as opposed to technical 
efficiency. Overall efficiency is calculated to increase about 7% from the first half of the period 
to the second when marketing efficiency is ignored. When marketing efficiency is included in 
the analysis the increase in overall efficiency is in the order of 9%.  
In the DEA methodology, high allocative efficiency occurs when there is an alignment 
between prices and scale of production; given a technological frontier, low (high) prices tend to 
support low (high) production scales. Spot prices were extremely favorable at the beginning of 
the period and smoothly deteriorated afterwards. We hypothesis that the increase in allocative 
efficiency during the period under analysis may be explained by the fact that plants’ capacity 
was, in average, too small for prices as favorable as those at the beginning of the period. 
Although some plants increased capacity during the period, average capacity did not completely 
adjusted to initial prices so that, as prices deteriorated, they became more aligned with existing   27 
average capacity. Increases in marketing efficiency across time suggest that plants improved 
their ability to bargain more favorable prices as they gained more experience in the market. 
In addition results in Table 8 suggest that increases in size (from small to big) increase 
overall efficiency by 7% without considering marketing efficiency, and 11.5% when marketing 
efficiency is accounted for. This improvement is achieved both through bargaining of better 
prices and increases in allocative efficiency presumably through reductions in price uncertainty. 
This in turn may reconcile two empirical facts in the industry; lack of evidence of increasing 
returns to scale and increases in average plant size. 
From testing of H3 and H4 integration appeared to increase efficiency of big DMUs. We 
discussed then that the correlation between the interaction term and efficiency may have been 
confounding the effect of size with the effect of the interaction given size. Results in the last row 
of Table 8 seem to confirm our suspicions. Integration does not seem to increase overall 
efficiency (or its components) when we focus our attention on big DMUs with high and low 
levels of integration. 
These results are obtained based on quarterly observations from different plants. So an 
interesting question to ask is whether these results are robust within plants; i.e. is there any 
evidence of learning-by-doing when we look at the evolution of individual plants rather than 
averages of the whole population? Is there any evidence that plants have increased their 
efficiency by increasing size? The answers to these questions can be found in Table 9. 
Plants in our sample (as opposed to DMUs) are, in average, 12% more efficient in price 
bargaining when they increase size from small to big. They are also, in average, 7% more 
allocative efficient when they increase size. Finally results suggest that plants became more   28 
efficient both in price bargaining (12%) and production planning given prices (10%) in time. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis of learning-by-doing in the corn ethanol industry. 
 
Conclusions 
This study exploits data from a survey of ethanol plants and tries to pinpoint the internal 
and boundary sources of plants’ performance and their drivers. Results reveal that DMUs are 
very efficient from a technical point of view as suggested by a standard deviation of 1% in 
technical efficiency. However, our results also show dispersion across plants’ overall economic 
efficiency. Bigger DMUs seem to perform better than smaller ones not because of economies of 
scale but because they can secure more favorable prices (higher marketing efficiency) and 
execute production plans accordingly (higher allocative efficiency). This may rationalize the 
increase in the size of the average plant observed in the industry in recent years. 
As indicated by the Federal Trade Commission, integration and market power in the 
ethanol industry has always been a concern of regulators. Exertion of market power in this 
industry would be economically inefficient for the conventional reasons (loss of economic 
surplus) but also for environmental reasons; i.e. if ethanol production is cut back more fossil 
fuels will be burnt and more gases will be emitted into the atmosphere. Our results do not seem 
to point towards the existence of incentives to vertically integrate. On the other hand, increases 
in size of a DMU seem to result in better pricing through bargaining. This may suggest potential 
incentives for horizontal consolidation. Calculations from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
indicate a reduction in concentration in the ethanol industry during 2008 and 2009, and an 
increase in concentration in 2010. So far, however, the calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes 
(HHI) seem to indicate that the corn ethanol industry remains un-concentrated. The apparent   29 
inconsistency between results obtained here (there seems to be economic benefits from merging 
and pooling production volumes) and those obtained by the FTC may be explained by several 
factors. First, according to the FTC, bankruptcies of a few large firms during 2009 and 2010 had 
a de-concentrating effect in the industry. Second, high profitability triggered a wave of entry into 
the industry that remained very strong until 2009. Entry has a de-concentration effect that may 
have offset consolidation, resulting in a low HHI. Entry has decelerated since 2009. Finally, the 
FTC measures concentration at the national level. Increases in size and/or consolidation may be 
occurring at smaller regional scales.  
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Table 1.  Characteristics of the seven surveyed plants 
States 




Rate (m. gal/y) 
Smallest  42.5 
Average  53.1 






03_2006  5 
04_2006  6 
01_2007  7 
02_2007  7 
03_2007  7 
04_2007  2 
Percent of 
Byproduct Sold 
as Dry DGS 
Smallest  0 
Average  54 





  Corn  Ethanol  DDGS  MWDGS 
Spot  0  0  3  1 
Customer Contract  5  2  0  1 























Average  4.8  361  7.8  13.7  21.3  14.5 
Std Dev  0.9  61  1.5  2.8  10  15.4 
Min  3.6  297  6.7  10.6  0  199 








    



















1  0.82  0.977  0.84  0.81  0.66 
2  0.84  1  0.84  0.90  0.76 
3  0.79  0.985  0.80  0.89  0.70 
4  0.72  1  0.72  0.90  0.64 
5  0.80  1  0.80  0.90  0.72 
6  0.85  0.979  0.87  1.05  0.89 
7  0.95  1  0.95  0.93  0.88 
8  0.82  1  0.82  1.06  0.88 
9  0.83  1  0.83  0.92  0.76 
10  0.80  0.997  0.80  1.06  0.84 
11  0.86  1  0.86  0.99  0.85 
12  0.94  1  0.94  1.03  0.97 
13  0.96  1  0.96  1.02  0.98 
14  0.95  1  0.95  0.95  0.90 
15  0.91  1  0.91  0.98  0.89 
16  0.92  1  0.92  0.87  0.81 
17  0.90  1  0.90  0.93  0.84 
18  0.88  1  0.88  0.99  0.87 
19  0.88  1  0.88  1.02  0.89 
20  0.996  1  0.996  0.97  0.97 
21  0.93  1  0.93  0.93  0.87 
22  0.92  1  0.92  0.95  0.87 
23  0.93  1  0.93  0.79  0.74 
24  0.89  1  0.89  0.98  0.87 
25  0.91  1  0.91  1.02  0.93 
26  1  1  1  0.99  0.99 
27  0.96  1  0.96  0.99  0.95 
28  0.95  1  0.95  1.01  0.96 
29  0.92  1  0.92  0.98  0.91 
30  0.94  1  0.94  0.99  0.93 
31  0.912  0.993  0.92  1.04  0.95 
32  0.80  1  0.80  1.27  1.02 
33  0.94  1  0.94  1.03  0.97 
Average  0.891  0.998  0.893  0.97  0.868 
Std Dev  0.07  0.01  0.07  0.09  0.10 
Min  0.72  0.979  0.72  0.79  0.64 
Max  1  1  1  1.27  1.02 
(a) Calculated as Overall Economic Efficient times Marketing Efficiency    
















1  0.977  0.955  0.955  0.977  IRS 
2  1  1  1  1  CRS 
3  0.985  0.976  0.976  0.991  IRS 
4  1  1  1  1  CRS 
5  1  1  1  1  CRS 
6  0.979  0.977  0.977  0.997  IRS 
7  1  1  1  1  CRS 
8  1  0.985  0.985  0.985  IRS 
9  1  1  1  1  CRS 
10  0.997  0.991  0.991  0.994  IRS 
11  1  1  1  1  CRS 
12  1  1  1  1  CRS 
13  1  1  1  1  CRS 
14  1  1  1  1  CRS 
15  1  0.953  0.951  0.951  DRS 
16  1  0.979  0.979  0.979  IRS 
17  1  1  1  1  CRS 
18  1  0.949  0.949  0.949  IRS 
19  1  1  1  1  CRS 
20  1  1  1  1  CRS 
21  1  1  1  1  CRS 
22  1  0.975  0.975  0.975  IRS 
23  1  0.993  0.993  0.993  IRS 
24  1  1  1  1  CRS 
25  1  1  1  1  CRS 
26  1  1  1  1  CRS 
27  1  1  1  1  CRS 
28  1  0.967  0.967  0.967  IRS 
29  1  0.944  0.944  0.944  IRS 
30  1  1  1  1  CRS 
31  0.993  0.983  0.983  0.990  IRS 
32  1  1  1  1  CRS 
33  1  1  0.976  0.976  DRS 






    














Integration  0.30  0.08  0.30 
Size*Integration  0.01  0.06  0.05 
Time (Quarter:1-6)  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.01 
Cooperative  0.81  0.64  0.89 
Size (Big/Small)  ~ 0  0.01  0.01 
1 This column displays the p-values of the hypothesis that the corresponding variable has no effect on 
overall economic efficiency; i.e. the closest this value to zero the stronger the effect of the treatment 
variable on efficiency. 
 
 
Table 5.b. Correlates of Overall Economic Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency, and 
Marketing Efficiency 
 














Time  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.01  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Size  -  -  -  ~ 0  0.01  0.01  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Integration  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.30  0.08  0.30  -  -  - 
Size*Integration  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.01  0.06  0.05 
Time-Size  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.02  ~ 0  0.05  0.04  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Time-
Integration  ~ 0  ~ 0  ~ 0  -  -  -  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.01  -  -  - 
Size-Integration  -  -  -  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.60  0.17  0.22  -  -  - 
Time- 
Size*Integration  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.03  -  -  -  -  -  -  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.11 
Time-Size-
Integration  ~ 0  ~ 0  ~ 0  0.39  0.56  0.26  0.01  0.01  0.04  -  -  - 
(a) Adjusted Overall Economic Efficiency, 





Table 6. Correlation between Efficiency Sources and Factors 






Time  0.74  0.75  0.39 
Size  0.57  0.43  0.45 
Integration  N/A  0.07  N/A 
Integration*Size  0.34  0.25  0.27 
 
 
    
Table 7. Average Effect of Time, Size, and Integration on Performance 














Average  0.974  0.998  0.868  0.893  0.891 
Average - Big  0.993  0.999  0.914  0.922  0.921 
Average - Small  0.953  0.997  0.820  0.863  0.860 
Big / Small  1.042  1.002  1.115  1.068  1.070 
Average - 1  0.879  0.993  0.697  0.800  0.794 
Average - 2  1.001  0.996  0.850  0.853  0.850 
Average 3  0.968  1.000  0.895  0.924  0.924 
Average first half  0.949  0.996  0.814  0.859  0.856 
Average 4  0.941  1.000  0.869  0.924  0.924 
Average 5  1.002  0.999  0.944  0.943  0.942 
Average 6  1.152  1.000  0.994  0.871  0.871 
Average second half  1.032  1.000  0.936  0.913  0.912 
Second half/First half  1.087  1.003  1.150  1.062  1.066 
Average – Big 
Integrated  0.985  0.997  0.896  0.909  0.918 
Average – Big Non-
Integrated  1  1  0.931  0.931  0.918 
Integrated/Non-
Integrated  0.985  0.997  0.963  0.978  1 
 







Average Size Effect (per plant)  1.12  1.07 













Fig. 1 – Iso-NOR and Sets 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Technical Efficiency 
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